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Abstract 
 
 Ice accretion on commercial fishing vessels is a problem faced by fishermen in cold climates. The 
U.S. Coast Guard has standards that pertain to the amount of icing fishing vessels must be able to safely 
accrete without capsizing. Using research on past vessel incidents and historical weather data, we have 
assessed the adequacy of the current standards and made recommendations to adjust U.S. Coast Guard 
standards on region, timeframe, and acceptable icing thickness on fishing vessels in Northeastern U.S.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Commercial fishing is the most hazardous occupation in the United States (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2008). With the demand for seafood leading to substantial monetary benefits, fishing 
vessels commonly voyage out in harsh weather conditions. One such hazard that commercial 
fishing vessels are battling while at sea is the problem that can arise from the accumulation of 
ice on the vessels, which can lead to instability and capsizing. Casualties such as the sinking of 
THE LADY OF GRACE, a fishing vessel that sank due to icing in 2007, have motivated interest for 
the Coast Guard to evaluate the standards and regulations concerning icing (Jack Kemerer & 
Mike Rosecrans, personal communication, September 29, 2008).  
 One way in which the Coast Guard attempts to lower the risk of a fishing vessel incident 
occurring due to icing is through stability testing requirements. For the Northeast region of the 
United States, the U.S. Coast Guard currently requires fishing vessels over 79 feet operating 
north of 42°N latitude between November 15 and April 15 to maintain stability with an 
assumed thickness of ice in a theoretical analysis (see Appendix C for full regulations). Our goal 
was to determine the adequacy of this standards looking mainly at the region and timeframe 
limitations as well as the assumed thickness implemented in stability testing. We reviewed past 
icing incidents and historical weather data to identified trends amongst them that were 
conducive to icing as well as consulted with experts in the fields of naval architecture and 
meteorology.  
 Looking at weather data before and after November 15 and April 15, we found no 
supporting evidence to show icing would be a high risk outside of this five month period in the 
ix 
 
Northeast U.S. and there for concluded the current timeframe is adequate and needs no 
adjustment. We also looked at weather data south of 42°N latitude analyzing the archival data 
available from NOAA’s buoy website. We were able to see and when events that would favor 
the accumulation of ice would occur. By analyzing the frequency and severity of the events we 
concluded that the current latitude limits is inadequate and that icing for is a danger for fishing 
vessels south of 42°N latitude and recommend it to be lowered to include all vessels traveling 
north of 38°N latitude.  
By analyzing past icing incident reports we noted significant differences between the 
amounts of ice build up in actual occurrences compared to the assumed stability thickness. We 
also spoke with experts in the fields of naval architecture who commented on the adequacy of 
the current criteria used in stability testing. We could make no conclusion on the adequacy of 
the assumed thickness used in testing, however we recommended the Coast Guard further 
research the adequacy of assumed ice loading as well as other stability criteria in the 
regulations.  
Lastly, we analyzed how adequately the Coast Guard is educating commercial fishermen 
on the issue of icing and concluded the Coast Guard is doing more than a sufficient job through 
weather warnings, educational flyers, and articles in various periodicals.  Ultimately we feel 
these conclusions and recommendations may help the Coast Guard to lower the risk of an icing 
incident occurring particularly in the fishing areas off New England. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Commercial fishing is currently the countries’ most hazardous occupation (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2008). From fierce storm conditions to rough waves, weather increases the risk 
of danger faced by fisherman during a voyage. Some aspects of the dangers fishing vessels face 
can be avoided, and ships can be strengthened to take on harsh situations. Regulations have 
been promulgated regarding the design and safety equipment of a fishing vessel to aid in 
avoiding the misfortunes the ocean can cause. The importance of a safe vessel cannot be 
overlooked because of incidents such as the sinking of the LADY OF GRACE, which claimed the 
lives of its four-man crew in January of 2007 (United States Coast Guard, 2007b). 
There is no one specific hazard that commercial fishing vessels face in cold regions. 
There are several contributing factors and conditions that lead to an array of problems for 
fishermen. One of the crucial hazards encountered by vessel operators is the phenomenon 
known as icing (United States Coast Guard, 2008b). The accumulation of ice on a vessel’s 
superstructure can lead to tragic incidents such as capsizing caused by instability. While only 
two of approximately 200 vessels lost to capsizing in the last 15 years in the northeast region of 
the United States were believed to be attributed directly to icing, this still remains a problem 
issue for commercial fishing vessels as well as the Coast Guard since they are responsible for 
developing safety standards pertaining to icing. 
Past research and analysis has led to standards and technologies which have been used 
in an effort to prevent and reduce icing.  One way in which this problem is being combated is by 
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electronic systems which use heated surfaces to counter icing within certain ranges of 
temperature and wind. The Coast Guard has implemented this system on their own vessels in 
the Great Lakes and Alaska regions (United States Coast Guard Academy, 2008).  Another 
approach by which they have attempted to solve this problem is that they require an assumed 
thickness of ice in stability analysis for vessels over 79 feet in the Northeast United States (Jack 
Kemerer and Mike Rosecrans, personal communication, September 29, 2008). The LADY OF 
GRACE, being shorter than 79 ft., did not fall into this category, which is one of the currently 
known inadequacies of the 1991 regulations. As a result, the Coast Guard has begun to extend 
the standards to include any vessel over 50 feet in length. Since the tragedy of the LADY OF 
GRACE sinking, numerous other comments have been made by numerous Coast Guard officials 
and naval architects on the validity of the current stability standards.  
There has been little research done since the early 1990’s on the issue of icing. This 
could be explained by the rare occurrence of a boat sinking due to icing. However, because of 
the incident involving the LADY OF GRACE, the Coast Guard has deemed it necessary to re-
examine current standards. According to fisherman and United States Coast Guard officials the 
current regulations may not be adequate in some aspects.  There has been approximately a 
twenty year gap in research done by the Coast Guard on the issue of icing, which is why it was 
crucial to obtain more current data and information.   
It was our goal to determine the adequacy of the 1991 Coast Guard icing standards and 
stability for vessels over 79 ft. and subsequently recommend any alterations (if any) that should 
be made. We set out to achieve this weather data to predict the rate and amount of icing that 
 3 
 
can occur. There were three main objectives we identified in order to achieve our goal. First, we 
identified the impacting factors of each past icing casualty on record, looking for any 
similarities. Second, we determined severe weather factors that lead to icing. Then we graphed 
the weather data correlating it with time of the year as well as the region where it was 
occurring. Third, we identified the stability criteria set forth in the 1991 standards. Using the 
current criteria used for predicting icing, we attempted to identify any inadequacies that could 
have led to errors through the use of expert opinions and past case studies. By achieving these 
objectives we were able to confidently determine inadequacies in the 1991 Coast Guard icing 
standards and suggest some modifications to these standards that could reduce the chances a 
fishing vessel accident would occur due to problems related to icing.  
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2 Background 
 
In this chapter we cover the background of the issue of icing and how it affects the 
commercial fishing industry as well as the Coast Guard (see Figure 2-1). The first section 
discusses broadly the dangers crew members of fishing vessels face as well as how icing as 
affected the industry in the past. Looking further into commercial fishing we analyze how 
human responsibility plays a role in the level of safety beyond the regulations and available 
technology. Next, we review the United States Coast Guard’s responsibilities on the water, from 
maritime law enforcement to how they are currently dealing with the risks of icing. After that, 
we discuss situations outside fishing safety that have icing problems, more specifically wind 
turbines, airplanes. We present how foreign countries handled the problem of icing. The last 
section of this chapter deals with the effects of icing on the stability of a fishing vessel.  
 
Figure 2-1:  Moderate ice build up on the deck and railings of a vessel. 
(photo courtesy of the Fishing Vessel Safety Division of the USCG) 
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2.1 Commercial Fishing 
 
Commercial fishing in cold regions all over the globe entails serious risks. In the United 
States these hazardous conditions and circumstances are particularly common in the waters 
surrounding Alaska and areas of New England. Commercial fishing continues to be one of the 
most dangerous occupations in the country today (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). This is in 
large part due to the operating conditions commercial fishing vessels face in cold regions.  
Temperature is a determining factor of these harsh conditions, but it is only one factor 
that contributes to the hazards in cold regions (Compher, 2007). Other pivotal variable that 
augment the challenges faced in these regions are isolated fishing grounds, seasonal darkness, 
cold waters, high winds, icing, fatigue, and short fishing seasons. The combination of these 
factors makes commercial fishing costly in several different ways. Due to these conditions the 
commercial fishing industry is vulnerable to crucial losses.  
Fisheries can suffer from the damage or loss of vessels, equipment, catch, and, most 
importantly, crew. In 2007, 61 commercial fishing vessels were lost in the United States (Hickey, 
2008). More importantly, that year the commercial fishing industry had a fatality rate of 
111.8/100,000 workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). More than half of these deaths were 
due to boats flooding, sinking, or capsizing. This fatality rate eclipsed the national average of 
3.7/100,000 workers in other industries and shows that this is a serious problem that needs 
attention.  Although fatalities associated with commercial fishing in cold regions are the main 
concern, there are other problems that need be addressed.  
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Most fishermen rely on their catch as their main source of income and well-being 
(Kemerer & Rosecrans, personal communication, November 17, 2008). Therefore, the vessels 
and equipment they operate are necessary tools for them to achieve success. Conditions in cold 
regions can damage and even destroy these tools that the men and women count on for their 
livelihood. As a result, the monetary damages must also be considered as part of the problem 
of commercial fishing in cold regions.   
Offshore fisheries, more specifically the shellfish fisheries, have a significantly higher 
fatality rate due to the fact the harvesting season for most species of crab is during the winter 
months (Hickey, 2008). In addition, the mass and structure of the vessels along with the 
equipment that is used on the vessels increases the risk factors. For example, the steel traps 
used on these boats weigh up to 800 pounds when empty, requiring cranes and heavy 
machinery to move them. The superstructure and stacks of traps can result in ship instability 
especially if combined with harsh weather conditions such as icing. Yet, the structure and 
mechanics of commercial fishing vessels are not the only contributors to hazards encountered 
in cold regions. 
As a result of short fishing seasons, fishermen must harvest as much as possible in a 
short period of time. Due to the time constraints and narrow window of opportunity, 
commercial fishermen tend to take serious risks (Kemerer & Rosecrans, personal 
communication, November 17, 2008). They often make trips regardless of weather conditions 
and are typically at sea for long periods of time without rest (see figure 2-2). The resulting 
fatigue can affect the body and mind of fishermen. They may become weaker and less aware of 
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their surroundings. At times, they may also overload the ship to increase their catch because 
they have to take advantage of the opportunities that arise. Although this strategy may seem 
irrational, it is unfortunately the nature of the commercial fishing industry. These men and 
women provide a commodity that is in constant demand, and they rely on the sale of their 
catch to provide for them. Commercial fishing is a way of life, so it must be understood in that 
light when designing measures to increase the safety of fishing vessels and crew members. 
 
Figure 2-2: Vessel operating in a cold climate region experiencing rough waves. 
(photo courtesy of the Fishing Vessel Safety Division of the USCG) 
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2.1.1 Background of Icing in Commercial Fishing 
 
 Although a rare cause of vessel sinking, ice build up is a common occurrence for 
commercial fishing vessels in cold climate regions (BMCM Bruce Morris, personal 
communication, December 9, 2008). Commercial fishermen often take high risks and constantly 
voyage out to sea despite severe weather warnings from the Coast Guard and National 
Weather Service. In the last six years there have been four incidents where vessels have sunk or 
been grounded due to icing (Dave Dickey, personal communication, December, 9 2008). Three 
of the vessel sinkings occurred off the coast of Alaska while the most recent, involving the LADY 
OF GRACE, sank off the coast of Nantucket, MA. Due to high costs, advanced technology that is 
currently available cannot be afforded by every vessel at sea. The lack of affordable effective 
preventions against icing combined with the willingness to make risky voyages was ultimately 
the cause of these four incidents.  
 Alaska, which experiences far harsher weather conditions than New England, has been 
the location for three of the most recent incidents (Dave Dickey, personal communication, 
December, 9 2008). According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
icing is most likely to occur with an air temperature below -1.7°C and sea surface temperature 
below 7 °C and wind speeds above  9.7 m/s (Guest, 2008). The addition of freezing sea spray, 
various forms of precipitation, and wave height also affects the amount of probable accretion. 
In 2002 the TRADEWIND, a 51 foot vessel, experienced severe ice build up due to below 
freezing temperatures and heavy seas washing over the vessels deck and freezing (United 
States Coast Guard, 2002). The accretion of ice on the hull caused the vessel to become 
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unstable. The crew was unable to break off the ice and in an attempt to slow the build up the 
captain of the boat attempted to veer away from the harsh conditions. While turning, the 
vessel began to roll to its starboard side and subsequently capsized and sank. While all three 
persons on board survived, the loss of the vessel was estimated $400,000. The other two 
vessels sank off the coast of Alaska in 2007. They were the HUNTER and STAR TREK and will be 
discussed later in this report.  
 The most recent and well known incident (also more thoroughly covered in chapter 4) 
was the sinking of the LADY OF GRACE in 2007. This incident involved a 75 foot vessel and 
claimed the lives of all four of its crew members (United States Coast Guard, 2007b). The vessel 
itself had been modified for scalloping operations and subsequently was submitted for a 
stability analysis to an independent Naval Architecture firm. Prior to the vessels departure 
there had been warnings of severe storm conditions involving low air and sea temperatures 
combined with freezing spray. The prolonged exposure to these conditions lead to a build up of 
more than two inches of ice on the super-structure and ultimately caused the vessel to capsize. 
Due to the failure of the deployment of two lifesaving devices: the electronic position indicating 
radio beacon and the inflatable life raft, the chance of survival for the crew was limited. This 
incident lead to various in depth reports into the issue of icing. 
Currently the most commonly utilized methods to battle the accretion of ice on a 
vessel’s structure, hull, and deck is the use of wooden mallets or baseball bats to literally break 
off the ice (see figure 2-6). Another method for the mitigation and avoidance of vessel icing 
involves ship maneuvers (Guest, 2008). When severe conditions arise that favor icing, the best 
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measure is to seek immediate shelter in a harbor or downwind of a land mass. If this is not 
possible, the next best course of action is to steam downwind to minimize sea spray.  
Another means that are available to reduce icing are the use of preventative coatings 
(Guest, 2008). Fluorocarbon penetrating coating and Vellox 140 are two ice fearing coatings 
that can be applied to the vessel hull and super-structure to repel water and prevent ice build 
up (these two specific coatings are recommended by the U.S. Navy). Other tools that can be 
used in the removal of ice are scrapers, shovels, spades, hoes, picks, and brooms. Much like one 
would take care of icing on their walkway at home, it is also recommended to use rock salt, or a 
fast acting alternative calcium chloride. Most chemicals contain alcohol and have been known 
to be corrosive, but there are less corrosive alternatives such as urea.  
 Weather is an unavoidable factor of commercial fishing unless one simply does not 
voyage out. The phenomenon of ice build up, although a rare cause of marine casualties, is a 
common occurrence on vessels in cold climate regions. There are affordable tools and simple 
methods to avoiding ice, but they are not always effective in absolute prevention and removal. 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as well as the Coast Guard and Navy 
issue awareness flyers and reports in an attempt in lower the risk of such casualties. As long as 
fishermen continue to take the risk of voyages during severe storms, icing will always be an 
issue.  
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2.1.2 Coast Guard’s Involvement with Commercial Fishing  
 
The Coast Guard’s responsibility on the water has an unparalleled importance when it 
comes to saving lives. Their motto: semper paratus, which means always ready, is a testament 
to their mission in the deep seas (United States Coast Guard, 2008a). There are specific units of 
the Coast Guard that are dedicated to commercial fishing safety. The members of these 
sections of the Coast Guard work to protect crew members of the vessels as well as ensure 
regulation compliance. They have worked throughout the years attacking every angle of safety, 
from response time to putting in place standards that prevent dangerous situations. 
 One of the concerns the Coast Guard is facing right now is the issue caused by the 
accumulation of ice on fishing vessels in cold climate regions. The Coast Guard has enacted 
standards as to the thickness of ice they require in stability testing; however because of 
incidents such as the tragedy of the vessel LADY OF GRACE, the Coast Guard is concerned that 
existing standards are inadequate (Kemerer & Rosecrans, personal communication, September 
29, 2008). 
 The Coast Guard icing standards, published in 1991, apply to the Northeast Atlantic and 
Northwest Pacific fishing regions (see Appendix C for full regulations). For the Northwest Pacific 
region, Commercial fishing vessels over 79 feet operating north of 66°30’ North latitude 
between November 15 and April 15 must submit their vessels for a stability analysis. In the 
analysis they must maintain stability with an assumed thickness of 1.3 inches of ice spread 
across the horizontal surfaces and 0.65 inches of ice spread across the vertical surfaces (these 
thicknesses correspond to 6.14 lbs/ft.^2 and 3.07 lbs/ft.^2 respectively). The horizontal 
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surfaces pertains to the deck and top of cabins and/or super structure and vertical surfaces 
pertain to the hull , walls of cabins and/or super structure, as well as the riggings of the boats. 
For vessels traveling in the Northeast Atlantic, the time frame in the regulations remains the 
same; however the assumed thicknesses in stability analysis are halved due to far less extreme 
weather conditions. This corresponds to a horizontal assumed thickness of 0.65 inches (3.07 
lbs/ft.^2) of ice and a vertical assumed thickness of 0.325 inches (1.535 lbs/ft.^2) of ice. The 
height of the center of gravity should be calculated according to the position of the assumed 
accumulated ice as defined in the regulations.   
The standards that are promulgated by the Coast Guard are implemented in a way to 
avoid as much as possible the search and rescue route of saving lives. Although in a perfect 
world, each crew member of a commercial fishing vessel would be knowledgeable of the rules 
and regulations of the ocean; this is not always the case (Jack Kemerer, personal 
communication, December 18, 2008). When marine safety incidents occur, it could be argued 
that the aftermath of the event is just as important as the accident itself. Reports written by 
officials of the USCG are essential in accident prevention. Each archive contains detailed 
information about all relevant data on each specific incident. Procedures like this are just some 
of the tools that the United States Coast Guard employs to prevent future incidents.  
 One office of the Coast Guard that is vital to aiding a vessel in distress is the search and 
rescue division, which is probably the most recognized section of the Coast Guard (United 
States Coast Guard, 2007d). The search and rescue division falls under the “Safety” category of 
the Coast Guard, as defined in their 2007 report. In 2006, the United States Coast Guard 
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responded to over 28,000 search and rescue cases, rescuing 85.3% of those at risk. These cases 
can range from recreational boating to commercial fishing, but it also should be noted that the 
rate of deaths and injuries has declined over the past 5 years. The Coast Guard believes that by 
constantly improving its technology and other measures, they have played a key role in this 
decreasing trend. 
One such improvement was in 2006 when the Coast Guard instituted “Rescue 21” and 
“Project Deepwater” (United States Coast Guard, 2007d). Utilizing GPS (global positioning 
system) and advanced communication technology, Rescue 21 covers over 20,000 miles of 
United States coastline. Through satellite communication, distress signals are relayed and 
direction finding computes the line of bearing. The distress call, as well as the line of bearing, is 
sent to the nearest Coast Guard ground center, and the necessary units are dispatched to aid 
the victims. Rescue 21 also replaces obsolete forms of communication such as FM transmitters.  
Much like Rescue 21, Project Deepwater’s purpose is to seek out and replace all 
obsolete vessels and aircraft, as well as modernizing command, control, and logistic systems 
(United States Coast Guard, 2007d). The 25 year program’s goal is to recapitalize all USCG 
assets. With $24 billion invested in the program, the Coast Guard has been working with 
independent companies to upgrade equipment from land to air. The upgrades will be linked 
intelligence systems for better communication and execution. Innovations such as Rescue 21 
and project Deepwater clearly show how the Coast Guard is constantly making improvements 
that adapt to the needs of the people they serve.  
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While the USCG serves everyone on the water, there are specific areas in which special 
attention is focused. Commercial fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations as well as 
one of the only methods to retrieve a vital food resource. It is no surprise that the Coast Guard 
has a whole unit dedicated to the safety of the crew members of these vessels (United States 
Coast Guard, 2007d). The Coast Guard certifies over 200,000 mariners through the Merchant 
Mariner Licensing and Documentation program. Although the majority of vessel operators are 
not required have a license, the captains of vessels over 200 gross tons are required to have 
one. Working in conjunction with various agencies as well as state and local governments, they 
strive to ensure safe practices.  
The USCG also provides a safer trip on the water through warnings. A warning that is 
constantly provided by the Coast Guard to mariners is that of harsh weather conditions. 
However, they have gone even further to warn fishing vessels of potential icing when necessary 
(South Coast Today, 2008). The Coast Guard is constantly working in conjunction with NOAA 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) to broadcast the probability of icing 
conditions. As mentioned above, the issue of icing on commercial fishing vessels is something 
the Coast Guard has been working to solve as of late. The occupation of commercial fishing 
demands a year-round duty, which is why vessels must go out despite of the cold weather. 
Capsizing and instability have led to numerous vessel accidents, and the warnings the Coast 
Guard supplies on icing are just another method they use to ensure safety.  
Some measures go beyond rules and regulations as science has played a key role in 
aiding the Coast Guard in its battle with the hazards of the sea. Besides the previously 
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mentioned advances the Coast Guard has made, there are actually improvements that are 
currently being implemented out on the ocean. One such instance is the “Buoy-Deck De-Icing 
System” for USCG 225’ Buoy tender, an electrical system used in the Great Lakes and Alaska as 
a tool against icing (United States Coast Guard Academy, 2008). The system prevents ice 
formation down to 0 degrees Fahrenheit with 15 knots of wind countering with a heat load of 
250 kilowatts. This has undoubtedly been an invaluable technology in the winter months. It is 
important to note, however, that this technology is not available to commercial fishing vessels 
(Mike Rosecrans, personal communication, November 17, 2008).  
Although it is impossible to make the waters themselves safer, the United States Coast 
Guard undoubtedly does everything it can to make sure that those who travel the ocean are 
safe. On average, every day the Coast Guard saves 14 lives, conducts 24 marine casualty 
investigations and assists 98 people in distress (United States Coast Guard, 2008d). Their role in 
society has an invaluable importance when it comes to ensuring human safety, law 
enforcement, and environmental pollution prevention.  
2.1.3 Human Factors in Commercial Fishing 
 
The United States Coast Guard’s Rules and Regulations can only go so far to lower the risk 
of dangers encountered on the open water by commercial fishing vessels. There has to be 
cooperation between the fisherman and the Coast Guard. This means proper training and an 
understanding of the responsibility that such a hazardous occupation entails. Proper 
qualifications have to be met by every licensed fisherman, but once on the water the human 
factor plays a huge role in the safety of a voyage. 
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 The very first aspect that one must take into consideration when measuring how much 
the human factor adds to the equation is that not every crew member on a commercial fishing 
vessel will always meet the legal qualifications mandated by the United States Coast Guard 
(Jack Kemerer, personal communication, December 18, 2008). Although disregarding some laws 
such as catch limits and citizenship might not play a role in safety, the lack of proper training 
could lead to serious consequences. Because the Coast Guard can only do so much through 
rules and regulations, they have to be met halfway by the cooperation of fisherman out on sea. 
To obtain a commercial fishing license fisherman must meet certain qualifications that ensure 
they understand the proper conduct while at sea. This is just one instance where cooperation 
between both parties must be maintained.  
 The necessity for every fisherman on a commercial boat to have the proper training and 
qualifications is demonstrated by the severity of the fines and punishments handed out for 
disregarding the law. The cost of violating clear-cut regulations set forth by the USCG can be up 
to $10,000 depending on the infraction (Marine Link, 2003). The Coast Guard monitors that 
their rules are being followed through exercises such as routine random boardings. These 
inspections are a useful tool to ensure that each boat has proper safety equipment, such as the 
correct number of flotation devices, which are vital in aiding in search and rescue.  
 One case where an inspection carried out by the Coast Guard prevented a possible 
volatile situation from occurring was in 2003 when a ship was found in violation of numerous 
regulations (Marine Link, 2003). While on patrol, the USCG cutter Moray conducted a routine 
boarding of two ships diving for sea urchins off the coast of Maine. Both vessels lacked the 
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proper number of fire extinguishers, had expired distress signals, and incorrect markings on 
their life rings and flotation devices. The two boats’ voyages were put to a halt, and they were 
escorted back to their home ports by Coast Guard authorities. This was just one instance where 
a situation was averted because of the USCG, but it also shows how the human responsibility 
factor could have possibly led to a tragedy.  
Another area of human responsibility that could possibly cause serious issues is the fatigue 
factor (Mike Rosecrans, personal communication, November 13, 2008). The duration of the 
shifts one crew member might endure are not eight hours long like many others, but can last up 
to 12-15 hours. The hindrance and toll on the mental state of experienced by a fisherman can 
be compared to that of the effects of alcohol. Judgment and one’s self realization of their 
surroundings cannot be relied on and that is when accidents occur. This area of human 
responsibility relates back to the choice all fishermen make when they take on the known risk 
that is involved in commercial fishing.    
When seconds count, every little aspect of how a situation is handled matters. When 
routine exercises like proper evacuation procedures are followed correctly, the chance of 
survival is raised that much more. The Coast Guard will always do their best on their end of an 
operation, but cooperation of the crew members is just as crucial for lives to be saved. 
2.2 The Effects of Icing outside New England Commercial Fishing 
 
Although the effect of icing is a prevalent factor faced by vessels in cold climate regions 
all over the New England coastal region, it is not the only area where there is an issue. Besides 
the other similar areas of the world such as the Arctic and Northern Pacific regions, there are 
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actually other examples of technology that encounter problems from icing. One such example is 
that planes attempting to take off in the winter season must go through de-icing procedures. 
Other areas that also experience this problem are power lines and wind turbines. While in each 
of these instances there are broad differences in how they are affected, they share key 
similarities in the current solutions to their respective scenarios.  
2.2.1 Canadian Coast Guard and the National Research Council of Canada  
 
 In June of 2005, the National Research Council of Canada (NRC), working in conjunction 
with the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), published a report detailing past incidents in the coastal 
Canadian region. Much like the cause for the United States Coast Guard’s current research into 
this area, this report was brought about by the fact there have been more than 1000 incidents 
caused by icing since 1970 (Kubat & Timco, 2005). Through tools such as models that estimate 
ice accretion and questionnaires that were given to fisherman who had first-hand experience, 
the NRC and the CCG have been battling this issue as long as the USCG.  
 Two of the models implemented by the Canadian Coast Guard are RIGICE and ICEMOD, 
both which are used to simulate and predict icing. Although these are not exclusively used by 
the CCG, both tools were highlighted in the 2005 Marine Icing Database report (Kubat & Timco, 
2005). ICEMOD was developed by SINTEF’s polar group, a division of an independent research 
group based out of Scandinavia (Eidnes, 2008). It is a one-dimensional tool which models ice 
accretion on cylindrical areas as well as horizontal and vertical surfaces. For an icing predictor 
to work accurately it must simulate certain factors to a specific level such as high wind speed, 
low air temperature, and low water temperature.  With the use of simple algorithms such 
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things like expected icing rates and icing risk classes can be determined.  In a 2008 report 
published by a representative of SINTEF Grim Eidnes praised the value of ICEMOD as well as 
RIGICE.  
 SINTEF also employs other methods of de-icing that prescribe the use of chemical 
compounds (Eidnes, 2008). The type of compound which is used depends on two factors: 
chemical makeup of the given surface as well as the actual texture. The chemical deployment is 
effective by introducing a low surface energy variable and by simulating a rough surface 
between the substrate and ice itself. The purpose of the introduction of this rough surface is 
that it creates air between the ice and substrate, which makes it more difficult for the ice to 
accumulate. Other areas in which SINTEF is attempting to counter the accumulation of ice 
involve freezing point depression fluids and high pressure water jetting. They also employ 
mechanical devices, and thermal and electrical techniques such as heaters and electro pulse 
techniques.  
 In the 2005 Nation Research Council of Canada’s (NRC) report, another way in which the 
problem was researched was through questionnaires handed out to fishermen (Kubat & Timco, 
2005). Jim Stallabras, a member of the NRC, published a report in 1980 which described the 
collection of ice on fishing vessels off the eastern coast of Canada. This report was very useful 
due to the collection and analysis of questionnaires answered by fisherman in the concerned 
region. The questionnaire basically requested information on first hand experiences of icing by 
the crew members, which in turn was reported back to the NRC. The report that followed was 
one of the first of its kind, establishing a relationship between icing and environmental 
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conditions and correlating it with geographical regions. The report was archived after its 
publication and just recently it was retrieved to aid in current research. Because of the 
uniqueness of the of Stallabras’s findings, his work was vital to the NRC’s 2005 report.  
2.2.2 Effects of Icing on Airplanes 
 
 Airports in cold climate regions, coastal and non-coastal, face issues caused by icing. The 
accumulation of ice causes hindrances to the physical aspects such as the aircrafts wings and 
take-off gear (Paula, 1997).  When the wings build up ice, this can lead to an unsmooth flow of 
air and lack of lift that can lead to crashing.  Similar to the methods employed in other areas, 
the airport crews utilize mechanical and chemical measures such as scrapers and chemical 
sprays. Another way which was not previously mentioned is the use of infrared systems to 
counter build up. A basic explanation is that through electromagnetic waves the transfer of 
energy between hot and cold surfaces is continually exchanged until both surfaces reach the 
same temperature.  
2.2.3 The Effects of Icing on Wind Turbines  
 
 Apart from airplanes and marine vessels the collection of ice on wind turbines does pose 
a direct human threat. The main issue caused by ice build-up is the hindrance to the actual 
motor. The other issue that is of greater concern to human safety is when the ice is shed from 
the blades and could possibly be propelled into the air, more commonly known as “ice throw”. 
One community in Ontario, Canada, is currently facing this issue and on their publication page 
they highlighted a couple of solutions to the issue such as heated rotor blades and shut down 
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procedures (The Blue Highlands Citizens Coalition, 2004). This is not a prevalent issue in the 
United States due to the lack of human proximity to the turbines and milder climate conditions, 
however there are other parts of the world that face this issue.  
 In a Finnish article linked from the Canadian communities’ publication page a more in-
depth and detailed report on ice-throw can be found (Kröning, Seifert, & Westerhellweg, 2003). 
Although the actual aspects of the accretion of icing may not seem relevant due to the fact that 
the turbines are on land, the measures that are taken in prevention have a strong importance 
in cross-over research in areas such as commercial fishing safety. The two areas in which 
hazardous conditions can arise from icing on turbines as detailed in the report are icing throw 
from an operating turbine and ice shedding from an idling position. The methods which were 
used by the Finnish researchers involved correlating wind conditions with where fragments 
were landing. From this information control systems of the turbines can be altered, lowering 
the risk of a hazardous incident. Solutions they implemented from this research are much like 
the systems the Canadian Coast Guard use on their ships, which predict conditions in order to 
give crew members a chance to adapt to the situation.  
2.3 Effects of Icing on Stability 
 
One of the most hazardous conditions commercial fishermen face in cold regions is the 
phenomenon of ice accretion (The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 2003). 
This occurs when a vessel accumulates ice on their superstructure or deckhouse due to sea 
spray and severe weather conditions. A full glossary of stability terms can be found in Appendix 
D. Typically, the conditions that lead to ice accretion are an air temperature of 0-28 degrees 
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Fahrenheit, a water temperature below 45 degrees Fahrenheit, and a wind speed above 18 
knots. These factors allow sea spray to freeze and accumulate on the vessel exponentially 
quickly because of the increase in surface area due to the ice, which then hinders the vessel’s 
stability. 
 
Figure 2-3: Relevant forces on a vessel’s stability. 
(source: The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 2003) 
 
Vessel stability is the ability of a ship to return itself to its upright position after being 
heeled over (The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 2003). The two primary 
forces involved in vessel stability are gravity and buoyancy (see Figure 2-3).  A vessel is stable 
when its center of buoyancy “B” shifts faster outboard than its center of gravity “G”. Adversely, 
a vessel is unstable when the center of gravity shifts faster outboard than the center of 
buoyancy (see Figure 2-4a).  The horizontal distance between the vessel’s center of gravity and 
its center of buoyancy is referred to as the righting arm (see Figure 2-4b). A vessel is stable 
when the righting arm is positive, and it is unstable when the righting arm is negative.  
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Figure 2-4: Positive and negative stability and the effects of gravity righting arm. 
 (source: The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 2003) 
 
 
Ice accretion can result in serious vessel instability leading to capsizing. The added weight 
of the accumulated ice, similar to overloading, raises the vessel’s center of gravity and lowers 
its freeboard (see Figure 2-5). As the vessel’s weight and center of gravity increases, the righting 
arm decreases which means the center of gravity begins to shift outboard faster. Once the 
righting arm is less than zero, the center of gravity shifts outboard faster than the center of 
buoyancy causing the vessel to capsize. The lower freeboard also causes the deck edge to 
submerge at smaller heel angles, which makes the vessel more likely to capsize.  The effect of 
ice accretion on vessel stability is a serious danger that must be minimized when commercial 
fishing vessels are out at sea. 
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Figure 2-5: Effects of additional weight. 
 (source: The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 2003) 
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2.4 Summary 
 
Currently the Coast Guard is trying to reduce the dangers of vessel icing by creating new 
regulations and technology. However, their efforts will go to waste without the cooperation of 
the fisherman. Since the 1991 icing standards has in place are over fifteen years old, the Coast 
Guard believes that new research needs to be done to solve this problem.  
 
Figure 2-6: Crewmembers breaking ice off of a vessel’s railing with mallets. 
(photo courtesy of the Fishing Vessel Safety Division of the USCG) 
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3 Methodology  
 
The goal of this project was to determine the adequacy of the 1991 Coast Guard icing 
stability standards for vessels over 79 feet in length and to recommend any revisions or 
amendments based on our findings. To achieve our goal we identified three objectives:  
a.) To identify the contributing factors in past icing incidents, accounting for human error 
as well as other unavoidable factors.  
b.) To determine the severe weather factors that led to icing, focusing on the major 
contributing variables.  
c.) To compare the stability criteria in the 1991 Coast Guard standards with the current 
icing predicting equations in use in order to evaluate time, region, and assumed thickness 
criteria.  
We developed a methodology to help us evaluate the 1991 standards that took into 
account these factors. We incorporated the ideas and concerns of the Coast Guard as well as 
those of stakeholders in the commercial fishing industry.  
3.1 Causes of Past Icing Incidents 
 
 Our first objective was to review past vessel incidents that were believed to be 
attributed to icing in order to identify not only key factors that caused the accidents but also to 
determine if there were any other causes such as human error. We reviewed four cases where 
icing was a major contributing factor to the accident. As a follow up to reading the casualty 
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report of the LADY OF GRACE, we also read a naval architect’s stability analysis report, which 
went into more depth about specific causes of the incident.  
3.1.1 Weather Related Causes of Past Icing Incidents 
 
 The first of several important aspects of the case studies we considered was the 
weather reports. By analyzing factors such as air temperature, wind speed, and wave height, 
information that lead to our conclusions and raised questions about the adequacy of 1991 
regulations were revealed. By examining data available from NOAA we were able to compare 
weather summaries from each incident. Ultimately we were able to analyze scenarios that were 
faced by each vessel and identify similarities among the casualties. 
 We focused on the professional opinions of the investigating officers and the safety 
examiners provided in each report. When the Coast Guard conducts an investigation into an 
incident, they often seek information from safety examiners and include their observations and 
subsequent recommendations. By analyzing each conclusion and recommendation made by the 
Coast Guard officials we were able to summarize the opinions of the role that icing played in 
the incidents. 
 Another aspect of our research was an investigation into the human factors that played 
a role in the outcome of each incident. By analyzing the casualty reports of each incident we 
were able to find where human behavior and decisions were main contributors to the incident. 
Reviewing areas where human factors came into play also helped us distinguish between 
inadequacies in the current icing standards and the contribution of human error.   
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 Using the accident reports, we reviewed the stability analysis completed on each vessel 
by either private or Coast Guard Naval Architects. By analyzing the data collected on each 
incident concerning the vessel’s stability characteristics we were able to identify certain 
similarities that contributed to each capsizing incident. In some cases improper stacking of traps 
and overloading led to a loss of vessel stability, on which the 1991 icing standards had no 
bearing. In other situations, vessels that followed proper loading procedures on their voyages 
and still capsized showed us where problems existed. It is important to note that the majority 
of the reports we analyzed did not include vessels over 79 feet in length to which the current 
USCG stability requirements apply to. By identifying instability as an issue on boats smaller than 
79 feet in length, it helped us conclude whether or not the current standards provided a 
reasonable level of safety for these smaller boats. It is also important to note that numerous 
safety examiners have already recommended that the Coast Guard look into their standards to 
include all vessels over 50 feet in length. 
3.1.2 Marine Safety Center Analysis 
 
 In order to better understand the LADY OF GRACE incident we conducted an interview 
with a member of the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center (MSC). When a vessel casualty occurs, 
besides the full casualty report that is produced, there may be a request for a more detailed 
look into certain aspects of the event by the experts at the MSC. In the case of the LADY OF 
GRACE, the MSC was asked to prepare a stability evaluation on the vessel. The marine safety 
officer assigned, LCDR Robert Compher, examined all factors and conditions of the incident and 
compiled a report that drew conclusions by looking at each aspect of the casualty.  
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The reason for talking with this officer was to obtain a better understanding of the 
assumptions made and the process used to make them. During this meeting we discussed his 
opinion of the incident and where he thought the current standards should be changed. We 
also shared the ideas we got from reading the report to see if our interpretations were valid. 
LCDR Compher recommended that we use the icing predictor as a main part of our research, an 
equation developed by Mr. James Overland of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) that can predict the rate of ice accretion based on several weather 
factors. LCDR Compher also noted that the NOAA website had numerous resources we could 
use to retrieve weather data covering the past 25 years.  
3.2 NOAA’s Weather Data 
 
When we first looked at NOAA’s website we experienced difficulty interpreting the 
weather data, subsequently we to set up a meeting with a NOAA representative who had 
knowledge of the website as well as understanding of the data contained therein. Through the 
Coast Guard we were able to contact the official currently in charge of NOAA’s marine icing 
sector of their marine modeling and analysis webpage. We met with Mr. Robert Grumbine and 
conducted a semi-structured interview that helped us better understand and interpret NOAA’s 
weather data.  
The icing casualty reports published by the Coast Guard utilized weather reports issued 
by the NOAA at the time of the incident as part of the analysis. When we met with the 
representative from the NOAA, we gained an understanding of the relationship between 
various weather factors and the accumulation of ice on vessels. We discussed various questions 
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that we had on how we wanted to collect and analyze the data, such as how far back we should 
go and the frequency (months or weeks) that we should use when analyzing the data. Mr. 
Grumbine pointed us in the direction of specific aspects of NOAA’s resources that he thought 
would benefit us the most.  
3.3 Evaluation of Current Standards 
 
The Coast Guard currently requires vessels operating north of 42°N latitude between 
November 15th and April 15th to be able to maintain stability with an assumed icing thickness of 
.325 inches. Using archival research and information retrieved from the interviews we 
conducted, we assessed whether the requirements in the 1991 Coast Guard standards provided 
reasonable safety guidelines. This was accomplished by looking closely at certain factors such as 
stability criteria and geographical and timeframe limitations (the full 1991 standards can be 
found in Appendix C).  
3.3.1 Timeframe and Region 
 
To determine if the current November 15 to April 15 timeframe is appropriate, we 
analyzed climate conditions 15 days before and after November 15 and April 15, respectively, 
to identify whether or not the time period should be extended or shortened. We specifically 
looked at sea surface temperature, air temperature, and wind speed during that time because 
those are the main variables that enter into the rate of ice accretion (Overland, 1989). We 
looked at daily averages recorded from NOAA at 38°N, 39°N, 40°N, 41°N, and 42°N latitudes in 
order to see if there was a high risk of icing which would indicate the dates should be amended. 
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NOAA lists weather thresholds, that when exceeded increase the probability of icing. We 
compared the monthly averages of these criteria against their respective thresholds for each 
latitude zone. We also recorded the frequency of events where conditions favored icing for at 
least 3 straight hours and graphed it based on region.   
Similar to our time frame analysis, we recorded and graphed the frequency of events as 
they pertained to region looking as south as 38°N. We also took into consideration where the 
F/V LADY OF GRACE had sunk south of 42°N latitude. Using these two variables as well as 
analysis of additional examples of actual accidents, we were able to conclude whether the area 
of risk for icing needed to be expanded or not. 
3.3.2 Stability and Minimum Thickness 
 
 By using data from all sources, we attempted to identify the adequacy in the 1991-
defined icing thickness regulation. We compared the theoretical results that we obtained 
through the use of historical weather conditions combined with icing prediction equations 
against the current standard of vertical distribution of 0.325 inches of ice and horizontal 
distribution of 3.07 inches of ice. We also compared the theoretical data with the recorded 
experienced thickness from all available icing incident casualty reports. Through these 
comparisons we determined if there were significant differences between the calculated icing 
predictions and the actual icing incidents. We looked at three vessel incidents, the STAR TREK, 
the HUNTER, and the LADY OF GRACE, all of which sank at least in part due to icing. We also 
spoke with a Mr. Jon Womack, an expert in the field of Naval Architecture and LCDR Robert 
 32 
 
Compher of the Coast Guard, who have experience with stability testing, on their thoughts of 
the current thickness.  
3.4 Human Factors in Icing Incidents 
 
 Beyond the contributing weather factors that led to each of the four icing incidents we 
reviewed, we looked into on how human responsibility and error were contributors to these 
accidents. We analyzed specific areas of human behavior such as fatigue, drug and alcohol use, 
as well as a lack of training and safety awareness. We also discussed with our liaisons how 
much of an issue these factors were in the commercial fishing industry. Beyond that, we 
watched a video on the tragedy of the NORTHERN EDGE, a vessel that sank in 2004 believed to 
be mainly attributed to a lack of crew training as well as a lack of an understanding of current 
fishing policy (i.e. stacking procedures for traps). Through discussions with Coast Guard officials 
and by looking at the role human factors played in the three vessel incidents, we were able to 
identify areas where human factors tended to have a strong influence on the outcome of an 
incident.  
3.5 Evaluation of C.G. Communication with Commercial Fishermen 
 
The final aspect of our research involved looking into the communication between the 
Coast Guard and commercial fishermen. The purpose of this was to evaluate the sufficiency of 
Coast Guard’s Role in spreading awareness of icing and other safety issues. We met with the 
members of the Fishing Vessel Safety Division of the Coast Guard to inquire what mediums they 
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were currently using to communicate with commercial fishermen. We requested the forms of 
communication, detail, as well as frequency and region as to which they publish their literature.  
3.6 Summary 
 
 Through these methods we determined the overall adequacy of the current icing 
standard as well as the quality of the Coast Guard’s communication with commercial fishermen. 
Using research on past incidents as well as an analysis of archival weather data, we attempted 
to view our problem from every angle. We considered the impact of human factors as well, 
noting where they may have contributed to past incidents. Furthermore, we analyzed the 
current mediums the Coast Guard is using to spread safety awareness. In the next chapter we 
discuss the results of our research and analyze how it may be used to make fishing safer during 
winter months. 
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4 Results and Analysis 
 
In this chapter we discuss the results from various areas pertaining to fishing vessel (F/V) 
icing that we researched. First, we discuss the contributing factors in the three case studies we 
reviewed. We identified three main weather variables: air temperature, sea surface 
temperature, and wind speed. Once all of these indicators pass a set threshold icing is most 
likely to occur. In each of the incidents we studied where these threshold were exceeded. We 
also identified various human factors that were contributors in each incident ranging from a 
lack of safety knowledge to illegal substance abuse. The second part of this chapter contains 
historical weather data going back as far as 23 years. By graphing these data we were able to 
identify specific regions and time frames where icing would pose a danger to commercial 
fishing vessels. The third aspect of our results and analysis contains a qualitative assessment of 
the current assumed thickness of ice that the Coast Guard requires vessels to be able to 
maintain stability with a uniform distribution in theoretical analysis. In final part of this chapter 
we analyze the sufficiency of the Coast Guard’s job of spreading awareness of the issue of icing.  
4.1 Contributing Factors in Past Icing Incidents 
 
 We reviewed in depth three vessel accidents: the STAR TREK, the HUNTER, and the LADY 
OF GRACE, all of which had occurred within the last two years and were mainly attributed to 
the accretion of ice. The incidents showed consistencies including but not limited to human 
responsibility error and severe weather conditions. After reviewing each of these incidents 
separately, we noted similarities among all three. It should be noted that the required thickness 
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in stability analysis for vessels operating in the Northwest Pacific is twice that of vessels 
operating in the Northeast Atlantic.  
4.1.1 Case I: F/V LADY OF GRACE  
 
One of the main factors that influenced the Coast Guard to review the current icing 
standards in cold climate regions was the incident involving the LADY OF GRACE, a 75-foot 
fishing vessel which sank off the coast of Nantucket in January of 2007 (United States Coast 
Guard, 2007b). As a result of this incident, a full casualty investigation was completed by the 
Coast Guard. Numerous observations were made by several different Coast Guard 
representatives, which ranged from analyzing the current standards to improving the 
conveyance of the effects of icing in cold climate to fishermen. The full report, which was 
published a short time after, reflected the expert opinions of investigating officers, safety 
examiners, and naval architects.  
The Coast Guard received and analyzed numerous forms of evidence that were crucial in 
arriving at their conclusions (United States Coast Guard, 2007b). Included in the information 
was, before and after photographs of the LADY OF GRACE, witness statements, and stability 
testing analysis reports by an independent naval architecture company. Weather reports were 
also analyzed that involved a trend analysis in various regions which focused on air 
temperature, wind speed, wave height, and water temperature among other things. There 
were two main aspects of the report that were relevant to the actual issue of icing beyond the 
data and evidence: recommendations and conclusions. 
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Among the various recommendations made by the investigating officers and safety 
examiners, it was clear that they agreed the current standards required a thorough review 
(United States Coast Guard, 2007b). The current standards pertaining to stability during icing 
only apply to approximately 5% of the fishing vessels because the standards only concern 
vessels that are greater than 79 feet in length. One of the main recommendations made by the 
Coast Guard officials was that they expand the regulations to apply to all vessels over 50 feet. 
The Coast Guard’s office of vessel activities is currently reviewing these standards. In the 
current requirements, the Coast Guard defines certain areas by longitude and latitude in which 
vessels should expect to be able to accept a certain thickness of ice. Another recommendation 
that was made was that the current icing region be reviewed. 
The current awareness of icing by the fishermen themselves was also brought into 
question. One of the main issues in the LADY OF GRACE incident was that certain safety devices 
did not function properly at the time of the incident (Ted Harrington, personal communication, 
October 22, 2008). In the report, officials requested that the Coast Guard look into better 
education on how to handle icing when it occurs. Lastly, it was stated that the Coast Guard 
should complete an analysis of casualty data involving icing in an attempt to correlate trends in 
other areas.  
In addition to the recommendations made by the safety examiners, several conclusions 
were made based on the findings (United States Coast Guard, 2007b). One of the main 
problems with the vessel itself was that it had been altered in order to be able to become a 
scalloping vessel. The changes made to the vessel created a greater surface area, which lead to 
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a greater accumulation of ice. Another conclusion made by the safety examiners was that the 
vessel, although less than 79 feet in length, would have failed the criteria set forth for a vessel 
over such a length. Lastly, it was concluded that the vessel was not properly fitted to be doing 
anything other than daytime scalloping, and it had been fishing at night.  
In retrospect, the human factor also played a huge role in the tragedy. In a stability 
analysis of the vessel prior to the incident, numerous restrictions and limitations were noted for 
the boat to meet Coast Guard requirements during a day time scalloping voyage (United States 
Coast Guard, 2007b). Among the comments, it was noted that the doors to certain 
compartments be made watertight and that the boat required certain water and weight loading 
features. These comments were either ignored or misunderstood by the crew of the LADY OF 
GRACE, as the failure to comply with these recommendations was directly linked to the causes 
of the sinking. The life rafts and EPIRB, two life saving devices, were stowed in a area of the 
boat that was not water tight allowing them to become encased in ice, and therefore unable to 
deploy.  
The tragedy of the LADY OF GRACE caused the Coast Guard to review the current 
standards originally published in 1991 (United States Coast Guard, 2007b). Although the Coast 
Guard can make standards more stringent, it falls on the fishermen to bear responsibility to 
comply with safety requirements in a dangerous profession. That being said, the Coast Guard 
realizes that human factors contribute to the majority of the accidents altogether, and 
therefore it is very hard to prevent them.  
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4.1.2 Case II: F/V STAR TREK 
 
 The second report that we reviewed was of the grounding of the STAR TREK, a 35-foot 
fishing vessel which lost engine power due to severe icing conditions off the coast of Alaska 
(USCG, 2007c). During a morning fishing voyage, the vessel accumulated extreme ice which led 
to a port list causing the engine becoming disabled. The crew members of the vessel were 
unable to break off the ice and, in an attempt to avoid sinking, the captain guided the vessel as 
it was drifting closer to shore and grounded the vessel.  
Currently the Coast Guard is working on expanding their icing standards to include all 
vessels over 50 feet and it should be noted that this vessel would not fall under those standards 
mainly because a vessel of such length cannot physically take even a light accretion of ice (LCDR 
Robert Compher, personal communication, December 12, 2008). At the time of the incident, 
the nearest buoy weather buoy data, a device that records weather data, registered over that 
morning an average air temperature of -7 °C and an average sea surface temperature of 2 °C 
(NOAA, 2008). The recorded wind speed at the time of the incident was about 40 knots or 21 
m/s (USCG, 2007c). According to NOAA, icing is most likely to occur with an air temperature 
below -1.7 °C, a sea surface temperature below 7 °C, and a wind speed above 18 knots or 9 m/s 
(NOAA, 2008). By computing the average of the air temperature, water temperature, and wind 
speed during the morning of the incident we were able to equate the likely rate of accretion the 
vessel was experiencing. The equation (see Equation 1), developed by Mr. James Overland in 
1989, yielded moderate rate of ice accretion corresponding to a probable 0.3 – .8 in/hr of ice 
build up (A graph of the variance of ice accretion rates with respect to air temperature and 
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wind speed at a fixed sea surface temperature of 2 °C can be seen in Figure 4.2.) As can be seen 
from the averages recorded during the morning of the incident, each variable surpassed its 
respective threshold for developing ice. There were also extreme wave heights as well as a light 
snow at the time of the incident. The validity of the thresholds provided by NOAA as well as the 
icing predictor is supported by the fact that at the time the vessel had grounded, it had taken 
on approximately 12 inches of ice (USCG, 2007c).  
 
Figure 4-1: Nomogram of the various rates of ice accretion at a fixed water temp. of 2°C. 
(source: Guest, 2008) 
 
It is clear that there were extreme conditions present at the time of the incident and the 
STAR TREK’s risk of capsizing due to icing would be would increased greatly due to its lack of 
size. The crew was physically unable to keep up with the removal of the ice on the vessel’s 
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structure, which in turn caused the boat to list, ultimately leading to loss of the engine’s power. 
Whether a lack of training was the cause of the crew’s inability to handle the icing is uncertain. 
From witness statements it seems as though the crew was prepared to handle the ice, but the 
conditions were just too severe. The captain of the boat also realized the imminent danger his 
crew and vessel were in, and in turn made the decision to go to shore to avoid sinking. This fact 
further indicates that weather was the major factor in this incident. Furthermore, we compared 
the weather data at the time of the incident to thresholds published by NOAA. 
4.1.3 Case III: F/V HUNTER 
 
 The final vessel casualty report we reviewed was the sinking of the 58-foot fishing vessel 
HUNTER, a vessel that sank due to extreme icing conditions in the Shelikof Strait off the coast of 
Alaska (USCG, 2007a). The crew was en route to fish for cod when the vessel encountered high 
winds and freezing spray. The vessel became top heavy and began to list eventually leading to 
its sinking. There were no casualties as the crew donned immersion suites, gave a MAYDAY 
signal, and activated an emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB).  
 The weather conditions at the time included an air temperature of -21 °C and wind 
speed of 60 knots or 31 m/s (USCG, 2007a). There were also reports of precipitating ice crystals 
as well as a continuous blowing spray. The fact that both air temperature and wind speed 
recorded were well above their respective threshold’s for icing coupled with reports of high 
winds and freezing spray are evidence that weather was the major cause of the incident. 
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 In the case of the sinking of the HUNTER, three of the crew members (not including the 
master) had been found to be under the influence of illegal drugs (USCG, 2007a). The drugs, in 
turn, inhibited the attention and focus of the crew which brought about an argument about the 
proper place to take the vessel. The crew was not only unable to break off the ice, but their 
argument exposed the vessel to dangerous weather conditions for a prolonged period of time. 
This was a case where the human error factor played a major role in the incident. 
 It was the opinion of the experts, that the accident probably couldn’t have been 
avoided. However, if the crew had not been under the influence of drugs, they may have been 
able to be more responsible, and therefore there would have been less of a chance the vessel 
would have had prolonged exposure to the harsh elements. It is important to note that while 
poor human judgment was not the cause of ice accretion on the vessel, it certainly played a 
major role in the vessel’s demise.  
4.1.4 Comparison of Cases I, II, and III 
 
 Human factors played an important role in the outcome of each of the incidents, and it 
was evident from issues that were revealed in the casualty reports. The owners of the LADY OF 
GRACE had been given specific guidelines that their vessel had to follow in order to operate 
safely, but in the Coast Guard’s casualty report it was clear the information was either ignored 
or misunderstood. Because there were no survivors, there is no way to know the actual reason 
why the guidelines were not followed and therefore impossible to distinguish between human 
error and a possible lack of their understanding of the limitations of the vessel. In the case of 
the HUNTER, the crew was unprepared to handle the adverse conditions and was also under 
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the influence of an illegal substance, representing two different causes for human error. The 
fact the STAR TREK was a 35-foot vessel operating in such conditions is evidence of a poor 
decision on the captain’s part as a vessel of that size is not built to be able to handle any build 
up of ice. However, we included the report of the STAR TREK as evidence of human error as 
well as in aiding us to identify contributing weather factors.  
 The Coast Guard realizes the weather is far mar severe in the upper Northeast Pacific 
which is reflected by the fact they allow for twice the amount of assumed thickness in stability 
testing than testing for vessels operating in the Northeast Atlantic. Therefore, the rate of 
accretion and amount of thickness of ice the HUNTER and the STAR TREK experienced could not 
be used to evaluate the thickness for the Northeast region (to be able to use the factors from 
these two cases in our evaluation, we would have to assume that the adequate standards for 
New England would be half of what they should be for the Northwest Pacific which we have no 
evidence of).  
By reviewing these three incidents, we have identified a trend that in each case the air 
temperature, sea surface temperature, and wind speed were all past the threshold identified by 
NOAA for when icing is likely to occur. From this trend we concluded that historical weather 
data before and after the institution of the 1991 standards should be analyzed to help predict 
icing related problems.  
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4.2 Weather Analysis 
 
Because we would be analyzing historical weather data and drawing conclusions on 
future weather conditions based on this analysis, we wanted to examine if there were any 
trends in sea surface temperatures. Much of our research entailed weather trends over various 
periods of time, and if factors such as sea surface temperature have substantially increased 
over time, then we would have to consider that in our analysis. In order to determine if this 
would be a substantial factor, we examined average monthly sea surface temperatures over the 
last ten years both north and south of 42° N Latitude. We plotted these data in order to identify 
any visible trends in sea surface temperature over time (see Figures 4-2 and 4-3). 
 
Figure 4-2: Average Monthly Sea Surface Temperature 1998-2008 between 42°N and 43°N 
 
 
Average Monthly Sea Surface Temperature 1998-2008 
(Area of 42 to 43 N)
0
5
10
15
20
25
Ja
n-
98
Ju
l-9
8
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Ja
n-
05
Ju
l-0
5
Ja
n-
06
Ju
l-0
6
Ja
n-
07
Ju
l-0
7
Ja
n-
08
Ju
l-0
8
D
e
g
re
e
s 
C
Sea Surface Temp.
Icing Threshold
 44 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Average Monthly Sea Surface Temperature 1998-2008 between 41°N and 42°N 
 
From these plots, there is no visible upward trend, therefore our analysis and predictions are 
based on relatively consistent weather trends. 
4.2.1 Identifying Regions Where Icing Occurs 
 
 The first aspect of the current icing regulation we analyzed was the region in which the 
icing standard applies (see Appendix C). We used weather data acquired through NOAA’s 
National Data Buoy Center.  Seeing that our focus was on the northeast United States, we 
segmented the region into smaller zones, so that our data would be more accurate and more 
manageable (see Table 4-1). When numerous buoys were available in a certain region we chose 
those closest to fishing ports. In some cases there was only one buoy available in a region and 
one region, none at all. 
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Table 4-1: Buoy Zone Classification. 
(Green denotes regions included in 1991 standards/Yellow denotes regions not included) 
Zone Latitude Range  Buoy Location Relative Location 
1 44-45°N 44.273 °N Jonesport, ME 
2 43-44°N 43.320 °N Portland, ME 
3 42-43°N 42.345 °N Boston, MA 
4 41-42°N 41.397°N Buzzards Bay, MA 
5 39-40°N 40.25°N Long Island, NY 
6 38-39°N N/A Not Available 
7 37-38°N 38.464°N Delaware Bay 
8 36-37°N 37.5°N North-East VA 
 
Based on the fact that the LADY OF GRACE incident occurred below the 42° N latitude, 
we used zone 4 as our starting point (United States Coast Guard, 2007b). We compiled the 
historical data on the three weather factors that are used in icing prediction and produce an 
environment conducive to icing: sea surface temperature (SST), air temperature, and wind 
speed (see Appendix G). From these data, we plotted the average monthly extremes from 
1985-2001 of these three factors along with their icing thresholds; for thresholds we used 
rounded figures: below 0°C air temperature, below 7°C water temperature, and above 9 m/s 
wind speed. (see Figure 4-4 and 4-5) 
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Figure 4-4: Minimum monthly air sea temperatures between 1985 and 2001. 
         
 
 
Figure 4-5: Maximum Monthly Wind Speeds between 1985 and 2001. 
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The plot clearly shows that there are several months where all three factors surpass 
their respective thresholds. This means that icing conditions were present in zone 4 during the 
months of December through April, and yet zone 4 is currently outside the regulated region. 
(for further results showing distribution see Appendix F) 
 In order to further identify how far south icing conditions were present, we used the 
National Buoy Data Center search engine to identify how often the three weather factors meet, 
or surpassed their icing thresholds. We examined the number of occurrences, or events, where 
icing conditions were present within five zones south of 42°N during the winters 1997 to 2007. 
Occurrences are represented in the table by events. Events are defined by NOAA as three or 
more hours of consecutive weather conditions (NOAA, 2008). Below is a table showing the 
distribution events from a buoy located in the Delaware Bay area (see table 4-2), the lowest 
region we found that icing is a high risk factor for marine vessels. (We found that icing does not 
occur south of 38°N on the east coast of the United States) 
Table 4-2: Distribution of 91 Total Icing events for the winters of ‘97-’07. 
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 As can be from Table 2, icing events are a common occurrence during the months of 
January, February, and March in Delaware Bay. The worst winter, as far as icing is concerned, 
experienced by the Delaware Bay region in the past ten years was 21 events in the 02’-03’ 
winter. Delaware Bay experiences approximately eight events where the variables favoring icing 
are consistent for three or more hours. Although this might seem like a small number, events 
that are consistent for one to two hours clearly are not included in this table and still pose a 
high risk danger for fisherman therefore should not be forgotten.  
 After identifying the extent of the prevalence of icing conditions, we analyzed the 
severity of these conditions. In order to do so, we computed the expected icing for one of the 
most extreme days using the icing prediction equation for vessels heading downwind. (see 
Equation 1 and Table 4-3) 
Equation 1: The icing predicting equation developed by James Overland in 1989  
(source: Overland, 1989) 
 
Where: 
PPR=Predicted Rate of Icing 
Va = Wind Speed (m/s)  
Tf = Freezing Point of Sea Water (about -1.7 °C) 
Ta = Air Temperature (°C) 
Tw = Water Temperature (°C)  
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Table 4-3: Data recorded from an extreme event in zone 7. 
Day Wind Speed (m/s) Air Temp. ( C ) SST ( C ) PPR 
2/16/2007 12.1 -5.4 4.5 46.63 
 
 
The PPR for selected day was 46.63, which falls well within the category of moderate 
icing (see table 4-4). Therefore, vessels could experience substantial amounts icing as far south 
as zone 7.  
Table 4-4: Icing Class and Rates 
(source: NOAA, 2008) 
 
4.2.2 Time Period Analysis 
 
 The second aspect of the current icing regulations we analyzed was the regulated time 
frame within which the icing standard applies. Much like the regional analysis we completed, 
we utilized the “events” history for each region. Looking at zones 1, 2 and 3, which are currently 
in the 1991 icing regulations, we analyzed where the time of the year where icing events 
usually tended to begin and then dissipate. We were only able to develop tables for two of the 
three zones (Boston and Portland) as ten year historical data were not available for Jonesport, 
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ME (see Table 4-5 and 4-6). For a full results including distribution table and breakdown see 
Appendix B. 
Table 4-5: Distribution of 287 total icing events for the winters of ‘97-’07  
(Boston, MA) 
 
Table 4-6: Distribution of 259 total icing events for the winters of ‘97-‘07 
(Portland, ME) 
 
As can be seen from these two tables, the regions currently included in the 1991 icing 
regulations never experience icing events before December and after April. Further looking at 
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the events that occurred in April in the Boston and Portland region, there was never an event in 
April that occurred after April 15.  
Considering the Coast Guard might change their regulations to include more southern 
regions that may not have as severe winters as those in the far north we compared the 
distribution of events for two regions north and south of 42°N latitude.  
 
Figure 4-6: Distribution of icing events for Long Island. 
LONG ISLAND 97'-07' WINTERS 
DISTRIBUTION OF 140 TOTAL EVENTS
0%
2.94%
38.24% 37.50%
21.32%
0%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL
MONTHS
PE
R
C
EN
TA
GE
BOSTON 97'-07' WINTERS 
DISTRIBUTION OF 287 TOTAL EVENTS
0%
9.76%
36.93%
32.75%
18.12%
2.44%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL
MONTHS
PE
RC
EN
TA
G
E
Figure 4-7: Distribution of icing events for Boston. 
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As can be seen in the above figures while there is a vast difference in the number of 
events between the two regions the event distribution for Boston and Long Island are very 
similar, however looking at the distribution for Delaware Bay it can be seen that the majority of 
the events occur during the months of January and February at a far less frequency. (see figure 
4-8) 
 
Figure 4-8: Distribution of icing events for Delaware Bay. 
Appendix B contains the full distribution table and breakdown for the five buoys we 
completed the ten year analysis on. 
4.3 1991 Stability Analysis Criteria 
 
 In stability testing, the engineer applies a uniform distribution of 0.325 inches of ice 
across the vertical surface of a vessel and 3.07 inches of ice across the horizontal surface; the 
vessel with these loading must maintain stability in order to pass the Coast Guard’s 1991 icing 
regulations (Jon Womack, personal communication, December 12, 2008). We were unable to 
collect any technical data that would allow us to evaluate the thickness on a quantitative level. 
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However, from past case incidents and interviews with experts in the fields of Naval 
Architecture, we were able to produce some qualitative results. 
4.3.1 Marine Safety Center Analysis 
 
 According to the author of the LADY OF GRACE stability analysis report, LCDR Robert 
Compher, an officer of the Marine Safety Center, the assumed thickness of ice cited in the 1991 
Coast Guard standards needs to be reviewed, due to the fact that his analysis of the incident 
showed the vessel was likely taking on 0.75 inches or more of ice build-up per hour (Compher, 
2007). Compher’s computer aided analysis of the vessel’s structure showed that once 
approximately 2.25 inches of ice was uniformly distributed across the surface of the vessel, it 
would capsize. More specifically Compher applied 0.325 inches of ice across the hull, deck, and 
super structure of the vessel, which is different from the specific Coast Guard regulations (see 
Appendix C). For the railings and riggings he only applied ice to the top half, which he believed 
was more realistic.  
 One factor that showed a weakness in the current standard, was how there is no 
regulation for how thorough the stability analyses have to be carried out by the Naval Architect, 
Thomas M. Farrell Naval Architects, Inc. (Compher, 2007). Comparing the model that that Naval 
Architect made for the LADY OF GRACE to that of the post-incident stability analysis showed a 
major difference in detail. While the model created by the independent firm showed two main 
parts representing the LADY OF GRACE, Compher’s model was much more detailed with full 
riggings and railings shown (see figure 4-9 and 4-10).  
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Figure 4-9: LCDR Compher's model of the LADY OF GRACE. 
(source: Compher, 2007) 
 
Figure 4-10: Thomas M. Farrel Naval Architecture Inc.'s model of the LADY OF GRACE. 
(source: Compher, 2007) 
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As can be seen from a comparison of these two models, the one generated by Compher is far 
more detailed and therefore more accurate. Compher’s model also took eight times the 
amount of hours to complete then the other model (LCDR Robert Compher, personal 
communication, December 18, 2008). Because the Coast Guard has no requirement for the 
thoroughness of the stability analysis the owners of the LADY OF GRACE received a far less 
accurate report. This is an area where the economic factor comes into play. A more detailed 
report has a higher cost, and in an industry like Commercial Fishing, the fishermen are willing to 
take the risk to save costs.  
4.3.2 Past Incidents 
 
 We were unable to find any incidents that involved a vessel over 79 feet and therefore 
analyzed those above 50 feet because of the fact the Coast Guard is currently expanding their 
regulations to include all vessels over 50 feet. Assuming the Coast Guard would use a similar 
mark in their newer standards, we used incidents that involved vessels above 50 feet. In all 
three incidents the rate of accretion was at least at a rate of 0-0.3 inches/hour. Comparing this 
to the current assumed thickness, crews would have to be able to keep up with the removal of 
ice every half hour which would be unlikely to happen (LCDR Robert Compher, personal 
communication, December 12, 2008). Fishing vessel crew members who choose to voyage out 
into conditions that favor ice accretion would not likely do so planning on keeping up with the 
removal of ice every half hour.  
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4.3.3 Independent Naval Architect Analysis 
 
 Some of the commercial fishing vessels that are currently operating in the cold climate 
regions of the east coast of the United States were manufactured in the south and were 
converted over to be able to operate as scalloping and clamming vessels. We were able to meet 
with a Mr. Jon Womack, who works for a naval architecture firm located in Maryland and found 
out further information on these vessels. The vessels that he analyzes are 80-120 feet vessels 
that have been converted to be able operate as Mid-Atlantic clamming and fishing vessels. The 
majority are not able to maintain stability when tested with the current assumed thickness of 
ice and are not permitted to be operating in the current restricted time period and region (Jon 
Womack, personal communication, December 12, 2008). Also because of environmental 
regulations pertaining to permitted areas where vessels are allowed to harvest marine life, over 
the years the region has been gradually moving north up the east coast and therefore into 
colder waters. It was noted by Mr. Womack that perhaps the stability testing be altered from a 
uniform distribution method to a forward half distribution, which is more realistic and 
comparable to actual incidents and reports.  
4.4 Coast Guard Communication with Commercial Fishermen 
 
 We looked at the current methods the Coast Guard uses (outside of its 1991 icing 
regulations) to attempt and lower the risk of an incident occurring due to icing. Through various 
media, they publicize the problems and severity of the accumulation of ice. Although there are 
currently no seminars that are mainly focused on the issue of icing and commercial fishing 
vessels, it has been included in training sessions sponsored by the Coast Guard. After incidents 
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such as the tragedy of the NORTHERN EDGE, a commercial fishing vessel that sank in 2004 off 
the coast of Nantucket, MA, safety awareness among fisherman was brought into question by 
fisherman in the surrounding communities. Subsequently the Coast Guard sponsored numerous 
training sessions in which they sent safety officials, such as Kevin Coyle, who is regarded as one 
of the best safety examiners in the field of commercial fishing safety (Ted Harrington, personal 
communication, December 12, 2008). The fishing vessel safety division of the Coast Guard issue 
flyers that indicate the weather factors that are main contributors to the accretions of ice, as 
well as a breakdown of the effects on stability (Jack Kemerer, personal communication, 
December 12, 2008). They also write articles in various fishing periodicals and magazines that 
spread the awareness of issues commercial fishermen might face on the water.  
4.5 Summary 
 
 Over the duration of this project we indentified numerous contributing factors to the 
effects of icing on commercial fishing vessels. We discovered trends in the weather factors 
present in past incidents as well as in the humans factors involved. By collecting and graphing 
archival weather data we were also able to identify regions and time periods where marine 
vessel icing is a prevalent issue. We reviewed the stability analysis criteria, as well as gain 
expert opinions in the field of naval architecture. Finally, by reviewing the current methods the 
Coast Guard uses for spreading awareness of the issue of icing. From these results we were able 
to confidently make conclusions and recommendations on the adequacy of the 1991 icing 
standards. 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Commercial fishing in cold climate regions will always pose a higher risk regardless of the 
number of regulations imposed by the Coast Guard. Through various types of data analysis, we 
found reason to questions in the 1991 Coast Guard icing standards. If changed, they could 
lower the risk of a vessel accident due to icing. Focusing on the three main aspects of the 1991 
standards: time frame, region, and stability analysis of ice, as well as the Coast Guards methods 
for spreading awareness of the issue of icing, we have developed a useful tool possibly 
preventing incidents like the LADY OF GRACE from occurring in the future.  
 The first conclusion we made was pertaining to the current time period (Nov. 15 to April 
15), which the Coast Guard uses in its 1991 regulations. Looking at a monthly scale, historical 
averages showed trends of probable icing from the month of November to the month of April. 
Furthermore, by evaluation of the events where conditions that favor icing are consistent for at 
least three hours, we were able to see that over the past ten years icing was never an issue 
outside November 15 and April 15. We therefore concluded that the current timeframe is 
adequate and requires no adjustment. However, the Coast Guard should look into a 
shortened time period for fishing regions south of 42°N, as icing is not a problem as long of a 
time period as it is in the region north of 42°N. (Note: Although the results showed that icing 
was never likely to occur in the month of November, the Coast Guard would only make 
adjustments to expand the time period and not shorten it). 
 The second conclusion that we made pertained to the region the Coast Guard uses in 
the 1991 icing standards. Currently in the New England region, the Coast Guard’s regulations 
 59 
 
only pertain to vessels traveling north of 42°N latitude. Utilizing the three main weather factors 
NOAA uses to predict when icing is most likely to occur, we were able to determine when an 
event that would likely involve the accretion of ice at a light to moderate level would occur. We 
found that icing occurrence was probable as low as the 38°N parallel. As we went further south, 
the time in which icing was likely to be an issue for vessels shortened from November to April 
to January to February. We conclude from these results that the region defined in the 1991 
standards is inadequate and we recommend the Coast Guard expand their regulations to 
include vessels traveling north of 38°N.   
 The final aspect of the 1991 icing standards that we analyzed involved the stability 
criteria in theoretical testing. We were unable to produce any technical evidence to dispute the 
current assumed thickness or were unable to find any incidents involving vessels of 79 feet, 
however seeing as though the Coast Guard is currently expanding its standards to include all 
vessels over 50 feet, by looking at the LADY OF GRACE incident which was between 50-79 feet, 
as well as from speaking with experts in the field of naval architecture, the general consensus 
was that the mark be further reviewed.  We could make no concrete conclusion on the 
assumed thickness and but recommend that the Coast Guard further research the adequacy 
of the current assumed thickness for all vessels of 50 feet. However, we did conclude that the 
uniform distribution method listed in the 1991 regulations is inadequate as it is not 
comparable to the amount of accretion as well as area as to where vessels experience icing in 
realistic scenarios and recommend the Coast Guard look into requiring different methods 
such as a forward half distribution of ice. 
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 Although the Coast Guard is currently working on regulations to include all vessels over 
50 feet, human factors can never be overlooked. There were various precautions that could 
have been taken before the incident of the LADY OF GRACE, which merely involved following 
specific recommendations from a naval architect. Although the LADY OF GRACE probably would 
still have capsized due to the extreme conditions it was encountering, the lives of the four crew 
members who perished might have been saved had the survival equipment not been encased 
in ice and all the crew completed safety survival training. Whether it is the main cause of the 
incident and the reason for various other outcomes or not, human responsibility can never be 
ignored. Based on the various media which the Coast Guard uses to create awareness of the 
issue of icing and training seminars, we conclude the Coast Guard is doing an adequate job 
educated fishermen on the effects of icing. However, due to the fact that our 
recommendations call for the regulations to be expanded in an area previously not required 
to pass stability testing, that the Coast Guard expand their educational programs to the 
relevant fishing ports.  
 In summary, the 1991 icing standards have some inadequacies, and we recommend the 
Coast Guard make some adjustments to in order to lower the risk of an incident occurring due 
to icing. By expanding the region of concern for icing problems this will lower the risk of an 
incident occurring below of 42°N latitude. Also through further research into the stability 
criteria currently listed in the regulations, a more accurate assumed thickness and method of 
distribution could also lower the risk of vessels capsizing due to icing. Since the Coast Guard 
cannot prevent a vessel from voyaging out into harsh weather conditions, in end the 
responsibility falls on the fishermen themselves to maintain safety on their vessels. 
 61 
 
References  
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2008). National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2007. Washington 
D.C.: United States Department of Labor. 
Compher, R. (2007). REQUEST FOR STABILITY EVALUATION OF THE SINKING OF F/V LADY OF GRACE, O.N. 
599517. Washington D.C.: United States Coast Guard. 
Eidnes, G. (2008). Arctic Oil and Gas Operations 2008. Retrieved October 5, 2008, from Tekna: 
http://www.tekna.no/iKnowBase/Content/34319/Grim%20Eidnes.pdf  
Guest, P. (2008, August 20). Retrieved December 18, 2008, from Vessel Icing: 
http://www.weather.nps.navy.mil/%7Epsguest/contact.html 
Hickey, D. H. (2008). Analysis of Fishing Vessel Casualties. Washington D.C.: United States Coast Guard. 
Kröning, J., Seifert, H., & Westerhellweg, A. (2003). RISK ANALYSIS OF ICE THROW FROM WIND 
TURBINES. Wilhelmshaven: DEWI. 
Kubat, I., & Timco, G. (2005, June). NRC Marine Database. Retrieved October 5, 2008, from National 
Research Council of Canada: ftp://ftp2.chc.nrc.ca/CRTreports/PERD/NRC_Marine%20Icing_05.pdf 
Marine Link. (2003, December 18). Coast Guard Enforces Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety. Retrieved 
October 7, 2008, from MarineLink.com: 
http://www.marinelink.com/Story/Coast+Guard+Enforces+Commercial+Fishing+Vessel+Safety-
13304.html 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2008). National Data Buoy Center. Retrieved 
December 18, 2008, from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 
http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov.hmd.shtml 
Overland, J. E. (1989). Prediction of Icing for Near-Freezing Sea Temperatures. Seattle: National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration . 
Paula, G. (1997, May). Keeping ice off airplane wings. Retrieved October 13, 2008, from Mechanical 
Engineering: http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/may97/features/iceoff/iceoff.html 
South Coast Today. (2008, January 19). Coast Guard warns mariners of icing this weekend. Retrieved 
September 29, 2008, from South Coast Today: 
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080119/NEWS/801190318 
The Blue Highlands Citizens Coalition. (2004). Ice Throw. Retrieved October 5, 2008, from Blue Highlands 
Citizens Coalition: http://www.bhcc.ca/ice_throw.htm 
 62 
 
The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. (2003). A Guide to Fishing Vessel Stability. Jersey 
City: The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1997). Commercial Fishing Fatalities in Alaska. 
Cincinnati, OH: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 
United States Coast Guard. (1991). CHAPTER I--COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION . 
Retrieved October 15, 2008, from United States Coast Guard: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/get-cfr.cgi?TITLE=46&PART=28&SECTION=550&YEAR=2001&TYPE=TEXT 
United States Coast Guard. (2002). Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Incident Involving the F/V TRADEWIND. Kodiak: United States Coast Guard. 
United States Coast Guard. (2007a). Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Incident Involving the F/V HUNTER. Kodiak: United States Coast Guard. 
United States Coast Guard. (2007b). Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Incident Involving the F/V LADY OF GRACE. Washington D.C.: United States Coast Guard. 
United States Coast Guard. (2007c). Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Incident Involving the F/V STAR TREK. Kodiak: United States Coast Guard. 
United States Coast Guard. (2007d). U.S. Coast Guard: 2008 Budget in Brief. Retrieved October 7, 2008, 
from United States Coast Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/doc/FY08_Budget.pdf 
United States Coast Guard. (2008a). About Us: Get to Know Your Coasties! Retrieved October 7, 2008a, 
from United States Coast Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/ 
United States Coast Guard. (2008b). Ice buildup likely caused Lady of Grace to sink. Retrieved October 7, 
2008b, from United States Coast Guard: http://www.uscgnewengland.com/go/doc/778/189952/ 
United States Coast Guard. (2008c). Organization: How the Coast Guard is Set up. Retrieved October 7, 
2008, from United States Coast Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/organization.asp 
United States Coast Guard. (2008d). Overview: General Information on the US Coast Guard. Retrieved 
October 7, 2008, from United States Coast Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/overview.asp 
United States Coast Guard . (2008e). Media Gallery. Retrieved December 1, 2008, from Response Boat - 
Medium: http://www.responseboatproject.net 
United States Coast Guard Academy. (2008). Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering. Retrieved 
September 29, 2008, from Unite States Coast Guard Academy: 
http://www.cga.edu/display.aspx?id=6541 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute. (2007, May 15). Interdisciplinary and Global Studies Division . Retrieved 
October 8, 2008, from Worcester Polytechnic Institute: 
http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/IGSD/iqp.html 
 63 
 
Appendix A – USCG Mission Statement  
 
 The United States Coast Guard was established on August 4th, 1790 (United States Coast 
Guard, 2008a). Congress authorized the construction of ten vessels to enforce trade and tariff 
laws, as well as to monitor smuggling. In its early years, the USCG was known as the Revenue 
Marine and the Revenue Cutter Service. It wasn’t always in the “Life Saving Business”. The unit 
that was dedicated to saving lives and the enforcement of maritime law before 1915 was simply 
known as the Life-Saving Service. In that year the two services merged, and that marked the 
birth of the service’s current title. Although its purpose and name has changed since its 
conception, its principles have remained the same. 
 The Coast Guard consists of approximately 40,000 active men and women stationed all 
over the country (United States Coast Guard, 2008a).  A 2008 report published by the USCG, 
reported an estimated a 5.8 billion dollar budget, spread over numerous planned projects and 
sub-divisions. As of 2008, the Coast Guard has organized its purpose into three main categories: 
safety, security, and stewardship (United States Coast Guard, 2007d). These categories are 
broken down as can be seen in Table 0.1.  
 The Coast Guard, like other armed services in America, has a hierarchal structure. At the 
top of the chain of command is the Commandant (United States Coast Guard, 2008c). The 
Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Thad W. Allen, made the following statement pertaining to 
the Coast Guard’s constantly evolving role in serving the American public (United States Coast 
Guard, 2007d):  
 
 64 
 
As we adapt to meet new mission requirements we will retain our organizational 
character as military, multi-mission, maritime service. Our core values, principles of 
operation and leadership competencies-together with a bias for action remains 
fundamental to our success. This character has been tested from the rooftops of New 
Orleans to the oil platforms of the Persian Gulf. It sustains us. (p. 2) 
 
The United States Coast Guard realizes the importance of their role in society requires them to 
constantly evolve and adapt to every new situation that they face. Through numerous division, 
the thousands that make up the Coast Guard all work bettering various aspects of coastal and 
ocean responsibility. From environmental protection to maritime law enforcement, every day 
they strive to serve society to the best of their ability.  
 
Table 0-1: United States Coast Guard Division Breakdown. 
(Source: United States Coast Guard, 2007d, p. 2) 
Safety Security Stewardship 
Search and Rescue Ports, Waterways,  
& Coastal Security 
Marine Environmental Protection 
Marine Safety Illegal Drug Interdiction Living Marine Resources 
 Undocumented Migrant 
Interdiction 
Aids to Navigation 
 Defense Readiness Ice Operations 
 Other Law Enforcement  
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Appendix B – Full Distribution of Icing Events  
 
 Contained in pages 62-66 are the full results of the distribution of icing event during the past 
eleven inters for Portland, ME, Boston, MA, Buzzards Bay, Long Island, and Delaware Bay (NOAA, 2008). 
For each region there is a main table that correlates winters to number of events, the most severe 
(longest duration) event that month, the total number of events that winter, and the most severe event 
that winter. There is also a bar graph containing the distribution for each month over the past eleven 
winters. The third aspect of the results is a table that displays the breakdown by total events and 
percentage for each month. These results played a major role in the outcome of our conclusions and 
recommendations.  
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DISTRIBUTION OF ICING EVENTS FOR WINTERS 1997-2007 
PORTLAND, ME – 43.531°N 
 
 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
MONTH NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL 
PERCENT 0% 15.33% 36.15% 30.65% 15.71% 2.30% 
TOTAL 0 38 94 80 41 6 
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DISTRIBUTION OF ICING EVENTS FOR WINTERS 1997-2007 
BOSTON, MA – 42.354°N 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
MONTH NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL 
PERCENT 0% 9.76% 36.93% 32.75% 18.12% 2.44% 
TOTAL 0 28 106 94 52 7 
 
BOSTON 97'-07' WINTERS 
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DISTRIBUTION OF ICING EVENTS FOR WINTERS 1997-2007 
BUZZARDS BAY – 41.397°N 
 
 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
MONTH NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL 
PERCENT 0% 8.33% 20.83% 43.33% 23.33% 4.17% 
TOTAL 0 10 25 52 28 5 
 
BUZZARDS BAY 97'-07' WINTERS
 DISTRIBUTION OF 120 TOTAL EVENTS
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DISTRIBUTION OF ICING EVENTS FOR WINTERS 1997-2007 
LONG ISLAND, NY – 40.250°N 
 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
MONTH NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL 
PERCENT 0% 2.94% 38.24% 37.50% 21.32% 0% 
TOTAL 0 4 52 51 29 0 
 
 
LONG ISLAND 97'-07' WINTERS 
DISTRIBUTION OF 140 TOTAL EVENTS
0%
2.94%
38.24% 37.50%
21.32%
0%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL
MONTHS
PE
R
CE
N
TA
GE
 70 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF ICING EVENTS FOR WINTERS 1997-2007 
DELAWARE BAY – 38.464°N 
 
 
 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
MONTH NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL 
PERCENT 0% 5.49% 48.35% 32.97% 13.91% 0% 
TOTAL 0 5 44 30 12 0% 
 
 
 
DELAWARE BAY 97'-07' WINTERS 
DISTRIBUTION OF 91 TOTAL EVENTS 
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Appendix C – Current USCG Icing Regulations 
(Source: United States Coast Guard, 1991) 
 
§ 28.500 Applicability. 
    This subpart applies to each commercial fishing industry vessel  
which is 79 feet (24 meters) or more in length. 
§ 28.550 Icing. 
(a) Applicability. Each vessel that operates north of 42° North latitude between November 15 
and April 15 or south of 42° South latitude between April 15 and November 15 must meet the 
requirements of this section. 
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the weight of assumed ice on each 
surface above the waterline of a vessel which operates north of 66°30' North latitude or south 
of 66° South latitude must be assumed to be at least: 
(1) 6.14 pounds per square foot (30 Kilograms per square meter) of horizontal projected area 
which corresponds to a thickness of 1.3 inches (33 millimeters); and 
(2) 3.07 pounds per square foot (15 Kilograms per square meter) of vertical projected area 
which corresponds to a thickness of 0.65 inches (16.5 millimeters). 
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the weight of assumed ice on a vessel 
that operates north of 42° North but south of 66°30' North latitude or south of 42°South but 
north of 66° South latitude must be assumed to be at least one-half of the values required by 
paragraphs (b) (1) and (b) (2) of this section. 
(d) The height of the center of gravity of the accumulated ice should be calculated according to 
the position of each corresponding horizontal surface (deck and gangway) and each other 
continuous surface on which ice can reasonably be expected to accumulate. The projected 
horizontal and vertical area of each small discontinuous surface such as a rail, a spar, and 
rigging with no sail can be accounted for by increasing the calculated area by 15 percent. 
(e) The weight and location of ice must be included in the vessel’s weight and centers of gravity 
in each condition of loading when performing the stability calculations required by this subpart. 
 
[CGD 88–079, 56 FR 40393, Aug. 14, 1991; 56 FR 47679, Sept. 20, 1991] 
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Appendix D - Glossary of Stability Terms 
 
Broach or Broaching – The loss of control of a vessel’s direction when the vessel’s bow is buried in a 
wave and the stern is forced around by the following wave. 
Buoyancy – The forces acting to push the vessel up in the water. 
Capsizing Moment – The moment or torque created by a negative righting arm multiplied by the 
vessel’s displacement (weight) that is acting to capsize the vessel. 
Cargo – All of the fish caught as well as any ice, salt, or packaging carried to preserve the catch. 
Center of Buoyancy – The submerged geometric center of watertight volume of a vessel at a given heel 
angle. 
Center of Gravity – The point where the combined weight of the vessel can be considered concentrated 
acting to pull down the vessel. 
Draft – The vertical distance between the waterline and the bottom of the keel. 
Freeboard – The vertical distance between the waterline and the highest watertight deck. 
Free Surface – The motion of liquids in slack tanks, fish holds, or bilges. 
Gravity – The forces acting to pull the vessel down in the water. 
Heeling – The side to side rolling of the vessel. 
Hull – The enclosed portions of the vessel below the highest watertight deck that runs continuously 
from the bow to the stern. 
Inclining Experiment – Procedure used to determine a vessel’s lightship characteristics (weight, 
longitudinal center of gravity, and vertical center of gravity) used in all stability calculations.\ 
Initial Stability – The stability felt by the crew during operations in relatively calm seas, which for typical 
fishing vessels is limited to 10-20 degrees of heel from the initial upright position. 
List – A permanent heel angle that occurs when the vessel is not loaded evenly port and starboard or a 
weight is being lifted over the vessel’s side.  
Loll – A temporary heel angle that occurs from free surface effects or lifting weights. 
Negative Stability – The combination of the center of gravity and the center of buoyancy creates a 
capsizing action that forces the vessel to continue to roll over. This occurs when the center of gravity has 
shifted farther outboard than the center of buoyancy. 
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Overall Stability – The full range of stability from the initial upright equilibrium stability to the point of 
vanishing stability. 
Positive Stability – The combination of the center of gravity pulling down coupled with the center of 
buoyancy pushing up creates a righting action that forces the vessel back to its upright position. This 
occurs when the center of buoyancy has shifted farther outboard than the center of gravity. 
Righting Arm – The horizontal distance between the center of buoyancy and the center of gravity. 
Righting Arm Curve – The plot of righting arms over a range of heel angles for a given loading. 
Righting Moment – The moment or torque created by a positive righting arm multiplied by the vessel’s 
displacement (weight) that is acting to right the vessel. 
Ship Stores – All weights such as food or personal items that are consumed during a fishing voyage. 
 Stability – The ability of a floating object to return to its initial upright position. 
Stable Fishing Vessel – A fishing vessel that has sufficient stability to remain upright in current weather 
and fishing conditions. 
Superstructure or Deckhouse – The enclosed portions of the vessel above the highest watertight deck. 
Tankage – The consumable fluids, cargo tanks and ballast used during a voyage. 
Unstable Fishing Vessel – A fishing vessel that does not have sufficient stability to remain upright in 
current weather and fishing conditions and will capsize. 
Vessel’s Lightship – All of the “fixed” weights on the vessel that do not change during the voyage. 
Waterline – The position of the water surface along the hull. 
Watertight Envelope – The hull and watertight portions of the superstructure or deckhouses. 
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Appendix E – Presentation Flyer 
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Appendix F –Monthly Icing Averages for the region 41°N-42°N 
 
The following three graphs show the average monthly distribution for air temperature, sea surface 
temperature (SST), and wind speed. The top and bottom data points represent the maximum and 
minimum extremes respectively. The red area represents the middle 50% distribution from 25%-75%, 
and the green line represents the threshold for when icing is more likely to occur. We used these graphs 
in our preliminary results for finding the proper region to analyze (source: NOAA, 2008). 
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Appendix G – Full Historical Weather Results for the region 41°N-42°N 
 
The following table shows the full results for the monthly averages of air temperature, sea surface 
temperature (SST), and wind speed (WS) for figures 4-4 and 4-5 on pg. 46.  
 
 Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Max Air 13.6 10.8 19.3 17.8 27.9 28.5 29.4 27.3 27.1 25 29 16.4 
Mean Air 1 0.7 3 7.1 11.7 16.5 19.8 20.3 17.8 13.1 8.6 3.3 
Min Air -15.6 -15.2 -12.4 -0.1 3.5 9 12.2 12 6 1.6 -7.5 -14.3 
Air Thresh. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max SST -2.6 -1.5 -1 0.8 1.2 1.8 1.9 0.6 -0.6 -2.7 -3.2 -3.8 
Mean SST 6.1 6.2 9 9.2 7.2 10.8 10.1 5.5 4 5.7 4.5 6.2 
Min SST -8.7 -14.9 -20.6 -4.7 -1.9 -2.6 -3 -4.5 -10.8 -12.4 -14.3 -13 
Air Thresh. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Max WS 54 46.9 55.8 52.5 37.7 37.9 43.5 67.1 57.2 58.9 52.1 50.9 
Mean WS 17.4 16.5 16.4 15 13.8 13.2 12 11.9 13.1 15.5 17.4 17.7 
Min WS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WS Thresh. 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
             
 
 
